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ZERKALO NEDELI: INSANITY FAIR OR HUMAN FACTOR IN WHEELS OF STATE 
By all appearances, there is one good thing about all this muddle of political turmoil in Ukraine: it gives the people a wonderful opportunity to see the total impotence of the state machine’s wheels and all. Now, after a series of functional denunciations provoked and exchanged by the warring camps, even those who have never cared about politics before can see that the country exists but the state almost does not. The �almost� refers to those few politicians, government officials, diplomats, and judges who continue working for this state. Its wheels are really in bad condition and badly need repair.
The fact that this country keeps functioning in regular mode while the political leadership has been paralyzed for months proves that the majority of Ukrainians have learned to live without “governmental props”. All those who run small or mid-sized private businesses see that they carry on despite, not thanks to, state administration. They carry on in spite of corruption, in defiance of the permissive-prohibitive red-tape offices that multiply like bugs, notwithstanding the absence of steady fair rules, regardless of tremendous difficulties in protecting their interests and property in courts, and so on and so forth. It is certainly good that the people have learned to be minimally dependent on authorities. The problem is authorities’ reluctance to create proper conditions for maximal realization of the people’s creative potential. The majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the authorities’ performance. Even in the eastern parts of the country, 67 percent of people say that life has changed for the worse. The question is whether the government is able to perform its functions as it should and whether the opposition is able to oversee it. Ukraine’s recent history gives a negative answer. What if tomorrow this country has to confront a war, a natural disaster, another Chornobyl, a terrorist act, or a sharp rise in the price for imported fuels? Is this state machine able to protect the citizens and their interests? Because its immunity is very low, any virus - brought from the outside or proliferated due to internal factors - may become lethal. So what has debilitated the Ukrainian state?
The first factor is low executive professionalism. The sweeping staff reshuffles and shakeups in 2005 shattered the state machine: experienced bureaucrats were replaced by a host of unprepared people. The problem was aggravated by the comeback of the Yanukovych government that started another wave of staff reshuffles and shakeups. In fact, one clan replaced another, but the ordinary people never felt any better for it. Bureaucracy, like any profession, requires skills and experience. Bureaucracy in its red-tape sense is justly criticized as a negative social phenomenon. But is it right to sack all doctors and nurses in a hospital and hire plumbers and bricklayers instead?
Moreover, both the “Orange” team led by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko and the team led by Yanukovych tried to staff the government - from ministers to department chiefs - using a “party quota” principle. The only difference is that the Orange leaders stopped halfway and the Yanukovych team went all the way. As a result, there are very few “carriers of institutional memory” in most governmental offices (with inflated senior staffs). At best, they head departments or minor subdivisions. All important positions are divided among representatives of the ruling coalition. “I don’t care what he’s going to do - dangle his feet or carry paperclips. I must give this quota to the Socialists, - one of the vice-premiers told the ministers. Some ministers first heard the names of their deputies at Cabinet sessions where they were appointed - without any formal interview or professional approbation. Many of them are complete dimwits in the fields of their new responsibility.
The situation with the ministers is not much better. In informal conversations, Premier Yanukovych and his predecessors Tymoshenko and Yekhanurov confess that they would gladly part with almost all members of government if they could. They have seen that the people at the helm of most economic sectors are unskilled and unfit for such responsible positions. The principle of personal loyalty to the leaders of political forces prevails in each branch of power � executive, legislative, and judicial. That is one of Ukraine�s fatal political diseases.
Evidently, the preterm election is unlikely to change the Ukrainian parliament qualitatively. Therefore, the political forces should change the traditional approach to forming the new government. The country needs a technocratic government instead of partition of trophies among the winners.
The second debilitating factor is the irresponsibility of the big businesses that rule this country. There is a very important context to bear in mind: power in this country belongs to businessmen who made their fortunes in the mid-90s - the period of “wild capital accumulation”. In other words, they are not “hereditary businessmen” but smart dealers and unscrupulous sharks with a particular way of thinking and acting. They can make quick decisions; they know how to hit and how to bear up; at the same time, they stop at no barriers of morality, law, or public interests. These qualities are common to Ukrainian businessmen of all political colors. They may want to care for the country, but they can not. If they did, they would never have accumulated their capital at that time, by those means, and in such amounts. Businessmen, who are present in all political forces and are policy-makers in the major ones, can not and must not rule the state.
Who is the policy-maker in each economic sector - from energy to agriculture? - The one who holds the controlling stock. Who controls this policy-making? - Unfortunately, not the government that rubber-stamps resolutions; not the opposition that is too busy struggling for power; not the public that is deceived by official reports; not the National Security and Defense Council that changes secretaries like a lizard changes its tails; not the President who has long abandoned the idea of think-tank concentration in his apparatus; not the Prosecutor General Office that hunts witches and closes its eye to property felonies committed by its political patrons (irrespective of their color); not the disoriented secret services that are used only for eavesdropping or tackling political opponents; not the Control and Revision Department that plucks specks out of the eye, sitting on the log.
As long as big businessmen rule the country instead of developing industries, creating jobs, and civilizing competition, qualitative changes are impossible. There are some good examples of those who did not drown, letting go of the lifebelt named “MP mandate”. Viktor Pinchuk, for instance, obtained his immunity insurance by funding numerous humanitarian projects - AIDS prevention and alleviation programs, a gallery of modern art, the “Free Expression” live TV program, various student programs, etc. Did the country lose a thing? - Quite on the contrary. His patronage of arts can hardly help him in his competition with Igor Kolomoysky, but it can help him adapt to society and help society accept one of “those moneybags”. Another example is Alexander Yaroslavsky. This big businessman deliberately stood out of the 2006 election race, even though one of the major political parties guaranteed him a seat in the parliament. Having sold his stakes in the Ukrsibbank to a big French bank, Yaroslavsky consciously accepted civilized rules of the game that were comprehensible to his new partner. The absence of the MP status never told on his profits in the banking, construction, or chemical businesses. It was the gas price hikes that did, simply because there were (and are) the interests of big clans behind them.
Practically all big Ukrainian businessmen say the same: “We don’t want any preferences. We could do with equal, fair, and stable rules of the game for all.” They are right, but did they ever lift a finger to set such rules? - No, they did not. They stood aloof when one government after another sold the country’s energy security by the pound; they kept their noses clean in the swing of the “property takeover” epidemic that exposed the complete debility of the judicial system; they kept their distance when the political crisis resulted in lower capitalization of private businesses; they grudged their money to hire the best think tanks who would write bills to restore the judicial system; they never responded publicly to the misbalanced practice of VAT reimbursement. So far, they have not moved an inch further than talks about �the role of big business at the crucial moment of history�. All they do is build more villas (for themselves), restore historical monuments (for their good reputation), and sponsor political parties (for heaven knows what). Interestingly, almost all big and very big businessmen - both partisan and non-partisan - sponsor different political parties. By putting their eggs in different baskets, they want to retain their access to government resources and insure themselves against possible redistributions of property, irrespective of which party comes to power. However, none of the big businessmen has contributed to building strong regulatory frameworks where all would play by fair and equal rules and would respect any private property - pins or factories. They are simply still unaware of their social responsibility and political role.
Some of them, though, try to contribute to national interests. Rinat Akhmetov, for instance, has ordered an American company to develop a complex reform program for Ukraine. It is a good idea to have a detailed program based on geographic, demographic, economic, and even cultural peculiarities of different regions of Ukraine instead of a standard set of recommendations calqued from those offered to African or South-American governments� The question is: who is going to implement this program? The same officials who have proven their personal loyalty to their party bosses? There are other questions: how to make land a commodity in one coalition with the Communists; how to carry out self-government reforms within the totally unbalanced system of government; how to cooperate effectively with international alliances if the government has still been unable to adopt an annual target plan of cooperation with NATO; how to calculate the national budget if nobody knows in mid-2007 how much Russia will charge for natural gas in 2008; how to adopt legislative acts without consensus on key issues among the ideologically diverse allies in the coalition; how to steer the country ahead if the politicians and officials only act by friend-or-foe rules?
On the one hand, as long as business is at power, private and corporate policies will dominate over the state policy; arbitrariness - over objective priorities; the servicing role of courts and law enforcement bodies - over professional duty and law.
On the other hand, until businessmen realize their social responsibility, politicians will not act according to national interests. Only those businessmen who have something valuable to give society should have the right to take up the reigns of power. At present, when the people vote for political parties, not knowing the names of their potential representatives, and for the president with defective rights, the state machine actually remains beyond direct public control while businessmen (even without MP mandates) remain closer to power.
Hence, the third debilitating factor: politicking prevailing over policy. It is obvious that the latent struggle for power in the higher echelons has very little or nothing to do with struggle for the people’s interests. It is rather a struggle for the interests of hundreds - maybe thousands - of the powers that be. The bone of contention is not conceptual divergences on the budgetary or agrarian policies, or judicial reform, or identification of internal or external threats, or energy security, or energy saving projects. This struggle for power pursues one goal: to concentrate and channel financial and other resources into the desired direction, i.e. into particular pockets. It is this struggle for power, added to the low professionalism of executives, the ideological amorphousness of political parties, and the passivity of masses, that has made the country the way it is. There has to be some way to force the political leaders to look for new managers and seek new approaches to state management. They must listen to those who know how to manage state affairs, not those who can bribe, intimidate, and swindle. The latter words, actually, mirror and explain the current political processes in Ukraine. Do the Ukrainian political leaders have system analysts (instead of hired political experts)? Do they have strategists (instead of invited campaign managers)? Do they have capable executives (not only in money laundering or running offshore business)? Too few know what to do for the country and how. Too many know how to buy an Austrian bank; how to wheedle a gold cross from the church hierarch or a land plot from the mayor; how to make good money on reselling imported natural gas; how to make a few grand on registering a land plot with the local village council; what to offer an MP to make him change the faction; how to put the government of an autonomous republic under personal control and convert this control into colossal land property. The brains set for identifying, defending, and realizing national interests are rare.
The dominating principle of loyalty to the color of the political flag keeps rational managers and capable professionals out of key positions. If the new election does not change this status quo, Ukraine will remain a sitting duck - an easy prey for anyone who may lay his hands on it. If no new think tanks and managers come to take the place of the degenerating political-financial clans, the wheels of state will be a threat to both the civilized world and Ukrainian citizens.
Yulia MOSTOVAYA
“Zerkalo Nedeli”, Ukraine’s International Social Political Weekly, 2 – 8 June, 2007
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