| ZERKALO NEDELI: PARLIAMENTARY COMPANY, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
Many were surprised and amazed at President Yushchenko’s unusual and unexpected resolution upholding his right to dissolve the parliament. Analysts explained that the “spineless” President took the hard way because he did not want to surrender his real power to the coalition. Today, however, there are grounds for another explanation: the pre-term election campaign gives Yushchenko a unique chance to start an early presidential campaign. Of course, he cares about the fate of the pro-presidential bloc with the bulky name “Our Ukraine – Popular Self-Defense”, but his words and deeds suggest that his team regards the bloc as a handy instrument for raising his rating and that he cares a lot more about his victory in the next presidential race than the bloc’s victory in this parliamentary one.
Overcrowded Party
The pre-election congresses of three political heavyweights – the Tymoshenko Bloc, the Regions Party, and the OU-PSD – looked very much like pompous party congresses in the West – huge halls, enormous flags, loud drums, dazzling fireworks, colored balloons, uniformed cheerleaders, and expensive rock groups… Yet, behind that showiness there is an impression that Ukrainian political parties are getting more and more Soviet-like, leaving less and less room for democracy.
Every time the politicians from the pro-presidential camp mention the gains of the Orange Revolution, they note that party members feel freer today and that no one persecutes them for dissidence. In other words, Ukrainian political parties have a real chance now to fulfill their historic mission – to become an effective instrument of democracy by helping this society become structured.
The notorious political reform gave them an impetus for development, vesting them with necessary rights and responsibilities. In other words, Ukrainian political parties got the right to fulfill another mission – to become an effective instrument in implementing state policies by helping the system of government become structured.
The formal circumstances are favorable, but the parties turned out to be unprepared for such missions. They are dependent on their leaders even more than before and their leaders are even more intolerant to criticism and dissent. The party elite is a model of conformity. The gap between the central and local party organizations is as wide as ever before. So is the gap between them and the ordinary voters.
They have turned into tools in the hands of their ambitious leaders. Unencumbered with ideological principles or useless illusions, limited groups of people make key decisions and draw up candidate rolls. Obedient delegates only vote for what has been decided “on their behalf”.
There is a very symptomatic fact: delegates from each of the three party congresses had no possibility to correct their candidate rolls, receiving them minutes before the opening ceremony. They voted for the rolls humbly and unanimously.
Such submissiveness is something new. Until recently, the leading roles in almost all party structures were played by ideologically principled people. Then they turned into affiliates of governmental bodies or commercial companies or into “fan clubs” of worshippers around totem poles. Such organizations no longer need “ideologically-minded” functionaries. As a result, the candidate rolls of major political parties are topped by people uninhibited by all that philosophical stuff and moral nonsense. Such people never go against the grain.
It would be unfair to call all these parties “uncommitted”– there still are some principled people in their ranks, but they are no decision-makers, because they have either no possibility or no courage to stand their ground. Besides, they are too few, and those that happen “to be in that number” have to meet one strict demand: personal loyalty to the leader. Would they dare go against the grain?
We must admit that the major Ukrainian political parties are non-ideological and their leaders are uncommitted. Their election platforms are medleys of liberal, conservative, social-democratic, and all manner of other ideas. They cast different lures before voters but not one is going to keep its promises, and that is very disappointing.
A graphic example is the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc that constantly changes its formal orientation – from rightist to leftist and back to rightist again. Its ideology is an unknown quantity, but one thing is for sure: it is Tymoshenko’s party. No Tymoshenko – no party. She changes ideological postulates just like she changes her dresses to different occasions. Now she wears the FC Donetsk Shakhtar uniform shirt and then – a Louis Vuitton garment; now an exclusive French dress and then – a colorful embroidered Ukrainian overskirt…
Tymoshenko is not only the face and voice of her party. She is its brain and backbone. It is possible to transfuse blood, pull skin, and build up muscles, but it is impossible to replace the spine and gray cells. As long as Tymoshenko is in the game and has chances to make it to the top, there will always be people willing to enlist. As soon as her chances disappear, her bloc as a weighty political entity will cease to exist.
The situation in the Regions Party is somewhat different but very much similar. Instead of some political ideology, it professes regional patriotism. It hinges on Viktor Yanukovych, although there are richer and smarter people in its ranks. No Yanukovych – no Regions Party. Without him it would break up in two or more parts. The Orange Revolution made Yanukovych an idol for Eastern Ukraine – just like it made Yushchenko an idol for Western Ukraine. There is no one to replace Yanukovych, even though too many big shots from Donetsk would like to have another leader. Firstly, voters wouldn’t have another leader. Secondly, Yanukovych still manages to keep different centers of influence and business groups within the party from falling out and apart. So far those who joined the party in pursuit of money and power still get along with those who stand for the ideas of federalism and the official status of the Russian language and are against NATO. They have one common enemy, and they have one common leader who still has a chance to make it to the top.
The OU-PSD is an artificial alliance of different politicians and organizations. They allied for only one purpose: to prop up Yushchenko, who was shedding his political weight. They are aware that his reputation is far from impeccable, but they see no alternative. As long as Yushchenko retains the last remainders of power and influence and as long as he has chances to be the first man in the state, his loyal men under the orange banners will say and do anything for him, even against their own ideological principles and common sense.
Those who speculate about the “westernization” of Ukrainian political parties should answer three questions. If the leader of any influential party in the U.S. or any EU country were replaced, would that party vanish from that country’s political map? Why is it that no “Bush Bloc”, “Blair Party”, or “Sarkozy Movement” ever runs for parliament in the West? Where would the Regions Party, the Tymoshenko Bloc, and the OU-PSD go without Yanukovych, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko? The answers suggest very clearly that their campaign staff are just working for their leaders. This especially concerns the OU-PSD and Viktor Yushchenko.
Where Is the Boss?
The canvassers for each of the three major political forces complain about similar problems: staff shortages and a total muddle with documents. Each, however, takes a different way of looking at these problems. In the autocratic Tymoshenko Bloc, debates took very little time. This political alliance started running its race straight away and quite fast, and its platform rests on Tymoshenko’s ambitious program of “twelve breakthroughs”. It has her charisma and remarkable capacity for work. She is on a non-stop canvassing tour, persuading people in different parts of the country to vote for her team. In the west, where she is quite popular, she is campaigning mostly in the biggest centers. She concentrates on the central regions where her popularity rating has dropped significantly of late. In the east she counts on some “untapped reserves” in two or three regions and knows that in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and in Crimea her chances tend to zero.
Yanukovych seems to let it all ride, being sure of “his” voters: his campaign staffs in Donetsk, Lugansk, and other eastern regions as well as in Crimea prefer to save money and energy. He pins his hopes on voters in the central regions who are disillusioned about Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. The main canvassing topics there are not “the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance” or “the great and mighty Russian tongue”. The message is simple and plain: “Yanukovych is an effective manager and his government is an instrument of economic growth, stability, and higher living standards”. Experts note that this technique works. The Regions Party also puts in a lot of effort and money into local election commissions. So does the Tymoshenko Bloc, but the Regions Party has far more resources.
The OU-PSD has not launched its canvassing campaign yet. Early steps were taken by the Popular Self-Defense before it allied with Our Ukraine, but then the orange leaders wasted too much time debating and bargaining. This pro-presidential bloc has yet to assign roles, rights, and duties, to work out campaign tactics for each region, and to formulate its basic messages to voters in different parts of the country. And time is running out… Its very poor work with constituency election commissions is likely to leave it without a good deal of votes on September 30.
The OU-PSD builds its canvassing campaign on calls for abolishing MP immunity and privileges, but this populist slogan alone is not enough to win the race. Of course, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are for stripping MPs of immunity and privileges, but they are far deeper concerned about more serious problems like price hikes, unemployment, environmental hazards, etc.
All attempts to offer voters some more slogans were rejected point blank by [Yushchenko’s chief adviser for the election campaign –A.B.] Ivan Vasyunyk who argued that:
a) the idea belonged to experienced and clever U.S. political engineers who said that it would be best to build the canvassing campaign on one catchy slogan;
b) the U.S. experts were invited by the First Lady – she wouldn’t invite “hack-workers”;
c) Yushchenko trusts them and has blessed the “anti-immunity” struggle, and his word is a law.
The nine allied parties and hundreds of authoritative politicians swallowed it and humbly resigned to the secretly drawn-up candidate rolls.
Any idea articulated by any OU-PSD leader is presented as the President’s, but not all supporters of the “orange ideas” are Yushchenko’s supporters. With such an approach to the pre-election campaign, the ambitious objective “to outstrip the Tymoshenko Bloc in the race” hardly looks feasible.
This task reveals Yushchenko’s plans and fears very clearly. He definitely wants to stay in his chair for another term and his attempts to win back his rating with the help of OU-PSD are evident. He knows that in this country the prime minister post is a springboard for presidency. He believes that his prime competitors are Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, so his immediate task is not to let either become Prime Minister. If the Tymoshenko Bloc plus OU-PSD gain the majority in the new parliament (and the latter collects more votes), then Yushchenko will have the right to choose the head of government. If the Tymoshenko Bloc collects more votes, then he is ready to ally with the Regions Party, but on the condition that Yanukovych is not Prime Minister.
According to some sources, the Donetsk clan has no serious objections. Is Yanukovych in the know? He may be. Will he agree to this scheme? Hardly. On the other hand, there is Rinat Akhmetov who has his own “plan B”.
Is Yushchenko aware of the possible risks? Does he really hope that the Regions Party will help him collect votes in the east in 2010? Does he understand that neither his orange comrades nor even his loyal voters will forgive him for backing down again?
InTheCircleofFriends
Viktor Andriyovych is quite experienced in composing candidate rolls. But the content of the candidate rolls has never before depended on his personal opinion so much. The President’s favorites Yury Lutsenko and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, who are the main rivals inside the block, are so eager to get rid of former Our Ukrainian leaders that have joined their efforts in the lobby-fights against Roman Bezsmertny and the “dear friends”. They have reminded about all Bezsmertny’s failures, old and recent, real and mythical, and as a result Bezsmerty and some of his people – Igor Zhdanov, Anatoly Lutsenko, Tatyana Mokrydi – have been deprived of their deserved right to become the MPs and removed from the roll.
Finally, Yushchenko has limited the influence of once almighty “dear friends” whose presence became burdensome for him. The party’s financial position, against widespread opinion, has not been affected by their departure. Actually Orange oligarchs have not always been the main sponsors of Our Ukraine and Yushchenko. There are some reasons to consider that Pinchuk and Akhmetov have invested into election campaign-2006 more then all the Our Ukraine sponsors. And now the prime investor in OU-PSD’s election campaign is Igor Kolomoysky. The owner of Privat Group has appointed to the OU-PSD’s candidate roll at least five people that include Igor Palytsya – one of Kolomoysky’s close men. According to some sources of information Ilya Rybich, former head of Naftogaz, and Igor Pikovsky, former head of Promsvyaz, owe to Kolomoysky their places on OU-PSD’s candidate roll (but this information needs to be confirmed). The above names should be confusing for the delegates of the OU-PSD congress (which are supposed to be the chief anti-Kuchma force in the country) as these citizens are considered to be Kuchma‘s men. They should be confusing, but they are not.
After Bezsmertny and the “dear friends,” Baloha’s turn has come. Viktor Ivanovych has a lot of foes today that include Kyrylenko and Plyusch. According to our sources of information, it was Plyucsh who informed the President about the personal intention of the Presidential Secretariat’s head to appoint Mykola Shvets as acting governor of Dnipropetrovsk region.
Kyrylenko has also criticized Baloha in every possible ways. But the real reason for Baloha’s removal from the President’s close circle is not Kyrylenko’s and Plyusch’s criticism. The true reason is that Yushchenko is afraid of Baloha. Yushchenko has become a confident President and a cruel politician with Baloha’s help. As a result, some have started to doubt who is in charge of whom – Yushchenko is in charge of Baloha or Baloha is in charge of Yushchenko. And it seems like the President is among those in doubt. That’s why he has decided to limit the energy of his right hand man.
Baloha was removed from the process of composing the candidate rolls. He could only bring in several people – Igor Kryl and Vasyl Petevka.
Baloha is planning to become Prime Minister, notwithstanding his temporary disfavor. It is hard to believe that today, but it is too early to discount such a cunning politician as him.
Kyrylenko is also intending to become the head of the Cabinet of Ministers. But he has little chance, though he is the first among the President’s favorites. He doesn’t have enough influence within the party. Besides, Vyacheslav Anatolyevych is too careful and full of piety toward the President, which has been advantageous for him up until now but is becoming disadvantageous today.
Lutsenko is luckier than Kyrylenko. He and Kolomoysky became the co-authors of the OU-PSD’s candidate rolls. Although Yury Vitalyevych had to disagree with part of his party’s support group, to quarrel with Katerynchuk and to turn down some active People’s Self-Defense’s members for that because only “necessary people” have been included on the candidate roll through Lutsenko’s quota. They include Henady Moskal (whom Lutsenko would like to see as head of Ministry of Internal Affairs), Serhiy Vasylenko (Lutsenko’s long-time companion-in-arms), Oleksandr Omelchenko and Serhiy Kharovsky. The latter was responsible for internal security at Lutsenko’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. He also was a member of the supervisory board of Ukrnaftoproduct for some time and one of the stockholders of the legendary Ukragroprommashinves, for the control of which he won a fight against Pinchuk.
Lutsenko is not intending to become Prime Minister. He would like to be Kyiv’s Mayor, all the more this plan is complying with the plans of the main People’s Self-Defense’s sponsor – Davyd Zhvania. It looks like Davyd Vazhayevych is eager to get access to the capital’s lands and in order to remove the present “land inspectors”– Chernovetsky, Ivanov and Khmelnytsky – he needs his own personal mayor.
By the way, Lutsenko’s relocation to Yushchenko’s camp has negatively affected his rating in the capital. Yury Vitalyevych is aware of that. That’s why he has invited Omelchenko to his team – many (including Mykola Martynenko in the first place) have convinced him that Oleksandr Oleksadrovych is able to provide their party with the support of a considerable amount of Kyiv citizens. And Omelchenko said that he was not going to become mayor. Although people that know the former Kyiv mayor very well are sure that if there is a chance, Oleksandr Oleksandrovych would try his fortunes once again.
Lutsenko also needs Omelchenko because of Klychko, who is supported by Tymoshenko and is his serious rival in Kyiv mayoral campaign.
If Lutsenko is not elected Kyiv City mayor, he is ready to be a Vice Prime Minister for organized crime and corruption matters, reckoning that Henady Moskal will be the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Viktor Shemchuk – the head of Prosecutor General’s office.
Yury Vitalyevych certainly has the desire to become a President, in perspective. This circumstance is quite disturbing for the incumbent President. According to some sources of information, the disfavored Baloha has received an order from Yushchenko to look after Lutsenko because the head of state doesn’t want any additional rivals.
Serhii RAKHMANIN
“Zerkalo Nedeli”, Ukraine’s International Social Political Weekly, August 11-17, 2007
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