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KAZAKHSTAN – UZBEKISTAN: BILATERAL RELATIONS 
TIMUR POLJANNIKOV,
Political scientist, State University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow Prospects of Astana-Tashkent Axis
In early September 2006 Uzbek President Islom Karimov paid an official visit to Kazakhstan. A number of intergovernmental agreements in the spheres of economy and security (including the agreement on the formation of the Intergovernmental Coordination Council) were signed following the results of his meeting with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The two presidents exchanged personal compliments and pledged “everlasting friendship” of their peoples citing their national poets Abay Kunanbaev (Kazakhstan) and Alisher Navoi (Uzbekistan). In some analysts’ opinion, September 4, 2006 gave birth to a new geopolitical force in Central Asia - Astana-Tashkent Axis. But what are the real prospects of this undertaking?
Firstly, it is evident that in spite of all the assurances, Tashkent’s move towards Astana is made under the necessity: rapture with the USA after Andijon events forced President Karimov once again to turn to Russia and its strongest ally in Central Asia Kazakhstan (as a matter of fact, this turn signifies acknowledgement of Kazakhstan as the regional leader). In this connection one should pay attention to the following: in his public speech in Astana Karimov emphasized the necessity to widen and deepen the military-technical cooperation, while Nazarbayev spoke mainly about the economic issues.
Secondly, even in the current situation Uzbekistan is very reserved about the integration projects within the CIS (where the pivotal role is played by the Moscow – Astana alliance) choosing the bilateral interaction format. Thus, when in early spring, 2005 Nazarbayev proposed to form the Alliance of the Central Asian States Karimov commented: “Over the last 10 years several organizations have been formed within the CIS, and they proved to be nonviable – the EurAsian Economic Community, the Single Economic Space. Unfortunately, in order to win cheap authority, some of my colleagues speak various slogans and high-flown words about cooperation, but, as a matter of fact, nothing is being done”. By the way, in spring 1996, Karimov regarded those integration projects as “a veil behind which Moscow will be able to rob the Southern Republics of the former USSR and leave them in poverty for good”.
Thirdly, in spite of the obvious evidence of the ongoing economic integration of Uzbekistan, and Central Asia in general, around Kazakhstan – in 2006 Kazakhstan’s trade turnover with Uzbekistan increased by 27 percent, and between 1999 and 2004 it increased three-fold with all the Republics of the region – the question about its rate and specific forms remains open. Apart from that, in the Kazakh elite there is an influential group of “technocrats” who oppose the integration recalling the danger of import to the country of poverty, criminality and religious extremism.
Fourthly, speaking about the prospects of the rapprochement between Astana and Tashkent one should consider the dynamism of the internal political situation in each of the Republics and, above all, the dynamism of the clan balance in the elites. Andijon events that nearly undermined the political system of Uzbekistan – with the consequences predictable for the entire region – in many respects resulted from the deterioration of the clan battle for “Karimov’s legacy” (the rumors about his serious illness, which are persistently spread in the Central Asian political community, are unlikely to be groundless). At the same time, the events, which followed the murder of the eminent opposition figure Altynbek Sarsenbayev happening in February 2006 in Almaty, showed that Kazakhstan had also entered the low-intensity political crisis connected with the deterioration of the clan battle near Nazarbayev. In this sense, the strategic alliance proclaimed by the Kazakh and Uzbek Presidents resembles the alliance of two lame ducks.
Nevertheless, if Astana and Tashkent manage to keep the policy stated on September 4 in the foreseeable future, the composition of their demographic, economic and, first of all, military-technical potentials can (with Russia’s support) lead to the formation of the new regional security framework in Central Asia. We shall say once again that a great deal, or even everything, hinges on stability of Uzbekistan and on the “Karimov factor”.
September 20, 2006
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